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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The task of the Euratom Safeguards Office is to ensure that within the European
Union nuclear material is not diverted from its intended use and that safeguarding
obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement with a third state or an
international organisation are complied with.
This document describes the role and the legal basis of the Euratom Safeguards
Office and reports on its operation for the period 1999–2000. It also provides some
information on current developments and includes an outlook for the future.
As a result of its activities in 1999 and 2000, and subsequent evaluations, the
Euratom Safeguards Office did not find any indication that nuclear material had been
diverted from its intended peaceful use. Small discrepancies found during inspections
or the material balance evaluation were rectified or are still being investigated with
the operators concerned.
2. NUCLEARMATERIAL SAFEGUARDS
2.1. What is Nuclear Material Safeguards?
Safeguards is the set of measures performed by the controlling authority to verify
that nuclear material and equipment are not diverted from their intended (peaceful)
uses, e.g. are not used to produce nuclear weapons. The aim is to allow the use of
nuclear energy whilst ensuring that civil nuclear material remains in peaceful nuclear
programmes.
Nuclear materials include all substances containing one or more isotopes of thorium,
uranium, or plutonium. The relative safeguards significance of these materials
depends on their physical form, chemical and isotopic composition, concentration
and their status as fresh or irradiated material. Unirradiated plutonium and high–
enriched uranium1 (HEU) are considered as having the highest strategic value for
safeguards. Nuclear activities comprise the mining and conversion2 of uranium, its
enrichment3, fabrication4 into fuel elements for electricity generation in nuclear
1 HEU is uranium enriched to more than 20 % uranium–235.
2 A chemical process for converting uranium into uranium hexafluoride as feed material for an
enrichment plant.
3 An isotope separation process for increasing the abundance of uranium–235 in uranium.
4 The manufacturing of fuel assemblies for use in nuclear power reactors.
3power reactors, reprocessing5, storage of nuclear materials, and final disposal of
nuclear waste.
Nuclear material safeguards should not be confused with nuclear safety, physical
protection or ensuring the protection of human beings and of the environment from
the hazards of ionising radiation.
2.2. The Legal Basis of Euratom Safeguards
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, commonly called
the Euratom Treaty, constitutes the legal basis of Euratom Safeguards. It covers all
civil nuclear materials in the European Union from the moment they are mined (in
the European Union) or arrive, in any form, from outside the European Union. The
responsibilities and rights of all parties are specified in Chapter VII of the above
Treaty. The obligation to implement the Treaty provisions is given to the European
Commission.
The Treaty specifies that:
– The Commission shall satisfy itself that in the territories of the Member States
nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended uses and that particular
safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement
concluded with a third state or an international organisation are complied with
(Art. 77).
– Operators of nuclear installations shall declare to the Commission their Basic
Technical Characteristics6(BTC) (Art. 78§1);
– The Commission must approve the techniques for the chemical processing of
irradiated materials (Art. 78§2)
– The Commission shall require that operating records be kept and produced for
nuclear materials used, produced or transported (Art. 79);
– The Commission may send inspectors that at all times have access to all places,
data and persons dealing with materials, equipment or installations subject to
safeguards (Art. 81);
– The Commission may impose sanctions in the event of an infringement of the
safeguards obligations (Art. 83) and Member States shall ensure that they are
enforced;
– No discrimination on the grounds of use is permitted and safeguards may not
extend to materials intended to meet defence requirements (Art. 84).
The nature and the extent of the requirements referred to in Articles 78§1 and 79 are
defined in the Euratom Regulation No. 3227/76 and subsequent amendments. These
5 Separation of uranium and plutonium in spent fuel from highly radioactive fission products.
6 The Basic Technical Characteristics is a declaration by the plant operator to the Commission that
contains information on the design, operation and accountancy system of the installation that is of
safeguards relevance.
4documents define mainly the obligations of operators of nuclear installations towards
the Commission.
2.3. World-wide safeguards and the role of the United Nations
World–wide safeguards are the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), an organisation of the United Nations. It performs its activities
under the Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which all European Union Member
States have adhered. All nuclear material and activities in the 13 Non–Nuclear
Weapon States of the European Union are subject to IAEA safeguards as established
in the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA, the Community, and the Member
States, also referred to as the Verification Agreement. The United Kingdom and
France, the two Nuclear Weapon States of the European Union, have submitted their
civil nuclear material to IAEA safeguards under separate Safeguards Agreements
between the IAEA, the Community and the UK and France respectively. In these
Member States, the IAEA conducts safeguards inspections in only a limited number
of installations: those that have been designated by the IAEA for this purpose and
selected from a list submitted by each State. Within the European Union, IAEA
safeguards are implemented in close co-operation with Euratom safeguards. All
Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA stipulate that the IAEA shall make full use of
the Euratom safeguards system and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of Euratom
safeguards activities. The mechanism of this co–operation is detailed in a series of
understandings and working arrangements (see also 6.4).
3. SCOPE AND SURVEY OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS
Persons and undertakings holding nuclear material (operators) have to provide the
Commission with the Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) of their installation
following a detailed questionnaire. The information required includes a description
of the nuclear material used and how it is handled, as well as the system of nuclear
material accountancy control. Any changes to the BTC must be communicated to the
Commission.
The operators must establish and maintain a system of nuclear material accounts
when they start handling such material. Features of this material accounting system
are that all parts of the installation in which nuclear material may be found, have to
be allocated to a series of Material Balance Areas7 (MBA). The operators also have
to notify regularly their programme of activities, including the programme for the
taking of physical inventories. In addition, operators have to notify in advance
certain transfers, imports, and exports of nuclear material.
Commission inspectors of the Euratom Safeguards Office (ESO) are deployed in
order to verify that the operators fulfil the safeguards obligations of the Treaty and
the implementing Commission Regulation. They conduct inspections at the nuclear
installations in order to check:
7 An area in a nuclear installation defined in such a way that the nuclear material quantity in each transfer
into or out of this area can be determined, and the physical inventory of nuclear material in this area can
be determined when necessary, in order that the material balance for safeguards purposes can be
established.
5– the operators’ declaration of the BTC;
– the operators’ nuclear material accountancy and operating records;
– the consistency of these records with the reports on inventory changes and
physical inventory takings, made periodically to the Commission; and,
– the consistency of physical reality with these records and reports.
The Euratom Safeguards Office has an appropriate infrastructure to support its
inspection activities. It handles all accounting reports and notifications from
operators, processes them, and provides the basic data the inspectors need for
verification. It also provides logistical support in making measurement instruments,
seals, cameras, and other devices available to the inspectors, and in analysis of
samples taken for the inspectors.
For the verification and control of the material, the Euratom Safeguards Office can
draw on a range of technological resources. Non-destructive assay (NDA)
instruments are available for direct measurements of the quantity of plutonium and
uranium in different forms. Many such instruments are permanently installed at
nuclear installations. For calibration purposes, special reference materials prepared
for Euratom, are used. For certain bulk products, such as uranium hexafluoride and
input and output solutions in reprocessing plants, samples are routinely taken and
sent for analysis either to the Joint Research Centre's laboratories or to the Euratom
on–site laboratories (see also 5.1). Finally, containment and surveillance measures
ensure that the continuity of knowledge relating to specific nuclear material or a
place of work is maintained. To this end, optical surveillance units are installed
which, for example, take photographs at determined intervals. The images are
extracted periodically, and the records reviewed. Extensive use is made of seals,
particularly for material that may stay unchanged between verifications. The
Euratom Safeguards Office operates a secure computer system for the storage,
retrieval, and analysis of reported data, for the preparation of the reports for the
IAEA, for on-site evaluation of measurement results, and for the verification and
evaluation of operators' data.
The Euratom Safeguards Office does not itself conduct any research but relies on the
support provided by the Commission's research facilities at the Joint Research
Centre. It should also be noted that an increasing proportion of instrumentation and
equipment used for safeguards purposes is now available from commercial sources,
thereby reducing the related R&D costs and resulting in an increased efficiency.
All inspection activities and results are evaluated. A first assessment and evaluation
is made during inspections, mostly to confirm the consistency of data and absence of
major discrepancies. A more detailed evaluation is carried out at headquarters
including the checking of containment and surveillance data, the evaluation and
statistical analysis of measurement results, and the evaluation of material balances.
The results of such evaluations can show up discrepancies that require explanation.
In such cases, the Euratom Safeguards Office will initiate follow-up actions. They
range from requesting the operator to explain apparent anomalies, stepping up
inspection frequency and intensity, or changing the inspection strategy. If problems
persist, the option of proposing sanctions may be considered.
64. 1999/2000 INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS
4.1. Nuclear Material Quantities
The European Union area contains the full range of nuclear fuel cycle activities,
although they are not evenly dispersed throughout the Member States. The nuclear
material inventories in the installations under safeguards are constantly increasing
(see Table 1). The increase in plutonium stocks during the last decade by more than
150 percent to about 530 tonnes at the end of 2000 is of special safeguards interest
because of the sensitive nature of this material. During the same period, the uranium
inventory in the European Union increased by more than 50 percent to about 313000
tonnes at the end of 2000.
The nuclear installation operators report all nuclear material inventories and flows to
the Euratom Safeguards Office. They amount to about 1,5 million accountancy lines
per year, the large majority of which is received by electronic means. All these data
are checked for internal and external consistency (transit matching) and compliance
with Co-operation Agreements (see also paragraph 6.5). All errors and
inconsistencies revealed during the period 1999-2000 could be corrected after
consultation with the operators involved.
Accountancy reports are sent to the IAEA in fulfilment of the obligations, undertaken
by the European Union in the framework of its Safeguards Agreements with the
IAEA. During the period covered by this report, reporting to the IAEA was
accomplished within the deadlines required by the Agreements.
4.2. Inspection Effort, Distribution and Results
During the reporting period the Euratom safeguards activities were dominated by
activities in the large plutonium processing installations, such as reprocessing
facilities and plants for the fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuel8 (MOX). Of the total of
170009 person days spent during inspections in the reporting period more than 60
percent were performed in these installations (see also Table 2). Another important
share of the Euratom inspection effort was spent in installations for the enrichment of
uranium and the subsequent fabrication of fuel elements with low enriched uranium,
which made up almost 20 percent of the overall inspection effort. More than 15
percent was spent in safeguarding nuclear power reactors. Installations for the dry
storage of spent fuel, research centres, research reactors and small installations
account for the remaining 5 percent of the effort spent.
4.2.1. Reprocessing Facilities
At reprocessing facilities, spent fuel assemblies received from power reactors are
processed chemically to separate uranium and plutonium from the highly radioactive
fission products. The separated nuclear materials can be re-introduced in the nuclear
fuel cycle. The modern facilities in Sellafield, UK (THORP) and La Hague, France
8 Mixed Oxide Fuel is nuclear reactor fuel consisting of a mixture of the oxides of uranium and
plutonium.
9 This represents an average of about 70 days of inspection per year and per operational inspector.
7(UP2, UP3) are characterised by a high throughput10 and highly automated and
encapsulated processes.
Physical Inventory Verifications involving a run down of the installations are carried
out annually. They normally coincide with the interval between reprocessing
campaigns and/or major maintenance outages. Continuous inspections and automated
unattended safeguards systems are required to verify the nuclear material flows in
(spent fuel) and out (mainly uranium and plutonium oxide) of the facilities.
At THORP, the trial period has now ended and safeguards implementation has
entered a routine phase. The collection and evaluation of data from the installed
safeguards instrumentation were brought up to date. All activities necessary for
granting the approval under article 78§2 of the Euratom Treaty (see also 2.2) were
finalised and it is expected that formal approval will be granted by the Commission
in early 2001.
The Sellafield site also has some older reprocessing facilities for the treatment of so-
called Magnox-fuel from specific British–designed reactors. These facilities were
inspected routinely with satisfactory results.
All main plutonium input and output flows and inventories of the UP2/800 and UP3
reprocessing plants at La Hague were verified and allowed the ESO to confirm the
operator’s declarations. The ESO was able to draw satisfactory safeguards
conclusions but in a number of cases not within the required detection time11 due to
delays in the declaration by the operator of certain results of chemical analyses. The
operator has initiated actions to improve the situation.
The basic technical characteristics of the new UP2/800 plutonium conditioning unit
« R4 » have been evaluated in depth during the reference period: studies of
engineering drawings, on site verifications of main circuits, and verification of the
calibration of 10 tanks have been carried out.
The reprocessing plant at Dounreay in the United Kingdom did not operate during
the reporting period because of an earlier accidental shutdown. Difficulties were
experienced by the inspectors in verifying the physical inventory in this installation.
A series of measures were agreed between the Euratom Safeguards Office and the
operator, and eventually implemented, which enabled the Euratom Safeguards Office
to conclude a successful Physical Inventory Verification in October 2000.
4.2.2. Installations for the Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)
In MOX Fuel Fabrication Plants, the plutonium oxide produced in reprocessing
installations is used in a mixture with uranium oxide to fabricate MOX fuel elements
for subsequent use in nuclear power plants. Of the four existing plants in the
European Union, the MELOX plant at Marcoule, France and the new Sellafield
10 The total annual throughput of these three facilities adds up to over 3000 tonnes of fuel containing more
than 20 tonnes of plutonium.
11 Detection time is the maximum time that may elapse between diversion of nuclear material and its
detection by the safeguards authorities. Typically, the detection time for un–irradiated plutonium or
high enriched uranium is one month.
8MOX plant (SMP) represent the most modern installations of this kind, including
fully automated systems with process and stored material practically inaccessible.
MOX fuel fabrication plants are important for safeguards as they handle separated
plutonium. Inspections are carried out on a continuous basis in order to verify
receipts and shipments of plutonium, and to meet the timeliness goals for plutonium
of one month. One annual PIV is normally carried out. In order to reduce the
disruption to plant activities, and dose uptake by inspectors and facility staff, use is
made of automated measuring equipment and containment and surveillance (C/S)
measures wherever possible. As much as possible of the plutonium in the facilities is
kept under C/S to reduce the requirement for monthly re-measurement of the
material.
In the MELOX MOX fuel fabrication plant a specially adapted safeguards system
provides continuous assurance of non-diversion. The inspection scheme was
upgraded and the unattended verification equipment was expanded to accommodate
the recent increase in the plant’s production capacity and the extension of its
production lines. Preparations were started with the IAEA to verify jointly the
shipments of finished MOX fuel assemblies to Japan.
The Sellafield MOX fabrication plant (SMP) is expected to enter into operation
(plutonium commissioning) in mid 2001. All safeguards instrumentation, which is of
a highly sophisticated and automated nature, has been installed and is being
commissioned. The Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) have been verified.
The results of the safeguards inspections in the MOX-Demonstration-Facility
(MDF), also located in Sellafield, were satisfactory. This facility was definitively
closed down at the end of the reporting period but nuclear material still remains in
the plant.
In the MOX fabrication installation in Cadarache, the ESO recently implemented a
new safeguards approach. This implementation has been successful and has now
reached a routine phase.
The Belgian MOX fabrication facilities at Dessel were inspected by the Euratom
Safeguards Office and the IAEA with good results. During the reporting period, the
implementation of the New Partnership Approach (NPA) with the IAEA was
completed in this area. In this context, the technical equipment installed was
upgraded and complemented in order to cover all inspection activities envisaged.
For the safeguarding of fresh MOX fuel destined for Japan in transit at La Hague, a
new common safeguards approach was worked out and successfully implemented
with the IAEA. During the reporting period, two campaigns took place on material
originating from FBFC, Belgium.
The safeguards measures to be implemented during the decommissioning phases of
the fuel fabrication plant at the Hanau site in Germany were established and new
safeguards equipment was installed.
4.2.3. Enrichment Facilities
Modern Light Water Reactors need fuel with about 3 to 5 percent of the fissionable
uranium isotope U235. As natural uranium contains only 0.7 percent of this nuclide,
9an enrichment process is needed to achieve the desired concentration. Gaseous
uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is used as the process medium. In the European Union,
two companies offer this service for civil customers: URENCO and EURODIF.
URENCO operates three centrifuge plants at Almelo (NL), Capenhurst (UK) and
Gronau (D). EURODIF has a diffusion plant at Tricastin, France. Theoretically, all
enrichment plants can be used for the production of high-enriched uranium.
Therefore, they are of high relevance and strategic importance for safeguards.
The routine application of Safeguards at centrifuge enrichment plants is always
conducted together with the IAEA and involves one Physical Inventory Verification
(PIV) per year. In addition, there are intermittent inspections at approximately
monthly intervals to cover the verification of the throughput. A further number of
unannounced inspections are carried out to check that the sensitive process areas
have not been re-configured to produce uranium at a higher enrichment than
declared.
In the EURODIF enrichment plant, the setting up of a full safeguards approach that
meets the Euratom requirements was progressed and its MBA structures revised.
At the three URENCO facilities, which have undergone significant expansions in
production capacity over the last two years, High Performance Trace Analysis12
(HPTA), a new and powerful particle analysis technique has been applied.
Developed in close collaboration with the IAEA (which calls the method
Environmental Sampling), this method is used to provide timely detection of
enrichment at levels beyond declared and in particular, the clandestine production of
high enriched uranium. During 1999-2000, a large number of swipe samples were
collected at these installations and analysed in order to establish a baseline database
for future reference. This method, which is also used within the restricted access
zone of the process, considerably enhances the safeguards effectiveness in such
plants.
4.2.4. LEU13 Fuel Fabrication Plants, HEU1 Fuel Fabrication Plants, Conversion
Facilities
At LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, fuel assemblies are produced from low enriched
uranium (LEU) for subsequent use in nuclear power plants. Conversion facilities are
often co-located with this installation type and are needed to convert the enriched
UF6 produced in the enrichment facilities back to uranium oxide or to produce UF6
from natural uranium oxide before enrichment. In HEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, fuel
elements for research reactors using high-enriched uranium (HEU) are manufactured.
In the European Union, LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants are operational in Belgium,
France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. In these plants, the ESO normally
performs a Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) each year. This involves a
comprehensive verification of all material while production is stopped. Itemised lists
of the inventory are verified for completeness as well as correctness, and the
12 High Performance Trace Analysis, or Environmental Sampling, is a safeguards technique that includes
the taking and subsequent analysis of swipe samples taken inside or outside nuclear installations. It
allows the confirmation of past and present nuclear activities in the area that has been sampled through
the analysis (mainly particle analysis) of the traces of nuclear material collected on the swipe.
13 LEU is uranium enriched up to and including 20 % uranium–235.
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verification includes the taking of samples for detailed analysis in laboratories, in
addition to measurement of items by inspectors using portable instrumentation.
Intermittent inspections (7-11 per year), concentrating mainly on the verification of
inputs and outputs, take place between the PIVs.
While the LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants in France were inspected more intensively
than in the past, the ESO has not yet achieved a level of control of similar
installations elsewhere in Europe. Significant progress has been made, particularly in
the computerised data treatment and the preparation of an unattended station for the
measurements of product fuel assemblies.
Regarding the HEU Fuel Fabrication Plant in France, a main issue remains the
common use of parts of the installation for defence and civil purposes. Although
normally the production campaigns are clearly separated, the information flow and
the access granted to the inspectors are limited in certain cases by security
requirements imposed by the defence authorities. This prevented ESO from drawing
full safeguards conclusions for this plant. Discussions continue with the French
authorities to resolve this problem.
Progress was made in setting up a full safeguards approach that meets the Euratom
requirements in a French conversion and storage plant, including a revision of the
MBA structure. Access problems in certain areas of the plant were successfully
resolved.
The nuclear fuel for the UK electricity-generating reactors is manufactured in
Springfields. The last few years and especially 1999/2000 have been characterised by
the migration of AGR (Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor) fuel production from very old
manufacturing facilities to the new Oxide Fuel Complex (OFC), a unit that
consolidates the complete process from conversion to fuel element assembly. OFC
has become the focal point of safeguards activities at the Springfields site.
Considerable progress has been achieved in equipping some of the most inaccessible
areas with automated measuring systems in order to achieve safeguards objectives
while attaining important inspection resource savings.
4.2.5. Nuclear Power Reactors
Most of the nuclear power reactors operated in the European Union are of the Light
Water Reactor type (LWR), i.e. the reactors are cooled and moderated with normal
water. In addition, the UK operates MAGNOX and Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors
(AGR) which are moderated with graphite and cooled with CO2 gas. The operation
of LWRs using LEU is characterised by long periods (12-18 months) of continuous
operation. These periods, when the in-core fuel is inaccessible, are followed by
outages typically lasting 2-4 weeks when about one third of the (used) core fuel is
exchanged for fresh fuel from Fuel Fabrication Plants.
LWRs are inspected during this outage period when all the fuel is accessible for
verification. In situ verification techniques, involving expeditious testing for
attributes of fuel, are employed, on fuel discharged from the core. When such
verifications do not lead to conclusive results, other more intrusive techniques, which
may involve handling of the spent fuel, may be used. In addition to these direct
verification techniques, cameras are installed and seals are used at some LWRs in
order to facilitate oversight of the fuel and fuel handling activities. Intermittent
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inspections, to the extent that resources permit, are carried out typically at quarterly
intervals between outages.
A number of LWRs use MOX fuel elements to consume the plutonium produced
under their reprocessing contracts. Inspections dedicated to verify these fuel elements
in the Non Nuclear Weapon States have been assigned a higher priority over the past
two years with the result that safeguards implementation in these installations was
significantly improved.
4.2.6. Installations for the Dry Storage of Spent Fuel
A number of EU Member States have adopted a policy that will, in time, include the
direct disposal of spent fuel at geological repositories. Before these disposal sites are
operational, the spent fuel is stored under water in storage ponds or in shielded
storage casks under dry conditions. Storage installations can be located away from
the reactor at dedicated central facilities or at the reactor site itself.
As nuclear material becomes inaccessible for direct verification after loading in
shielded storage casks, all spent fuel elements being transferred to these casks are
systematically verified. Thereafter, the knowledge on the material is kept by
containment and surveillance measures such as sealing, video surveillance etc. This
activity is very time consuming and especially delicate in terms of planning. The
ESO therefore started the installation of unattended measurement stations that
significantly reduce inspector resource requirements.
Many spent fuel storage ponds are now at the limit of their capacity. Alternative
solutions have therefore been implemented such as outside reactor storage in
concrete bunkers or on-site dry storage installations, all of which require adequate
safeguards measures.
4.2.7. Other Installations
Routine safeguards started on large quantities of nuclear material that was brought
under Euratom safeguards through the Strategic Defence Review programme of the
British government.
The development of the new Research Reactor FR2 in Germany was followed and a
safeguards approach was developed. This facility is an important scientific resource
but does not represent a particular safeguards issue, even if it is operated with HEU.
Deficiencies in the internal nuclear material follow-up in a Research Centre in
Sweden resulted in the refusal by the ESO to accept the 2000 Physical Inventory
Taking (PIT). The problem was resolved by a review of the operator’s working
procedures following recommendations made by the ESO and a successful repetition
of the PIV shortly afterwards.
The 2000 Physical Inventory Taking (PIT) of a waste store in the United Kingdom
was also refused by the ESO. The operator took the necessary corrective actions and
repeated the Physical Inventory Taking; a new PIV is expected early in 2001.
An important verification problem appears in some installations (e.g. in Cadarache
and Sellafield) where old plutonium-holding materials are stored. Difficulties of
access and handling due to radiation protection and safety reasons, do not permit full
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routine safeguards activities to be performed. However, the status quo was preserved
by containment and surveillance systems.
4.3. Concluding remarks
The verification activities by the Euratom Safeguards Office during the reporting
period did not give any indication that nuclear material, which had been declared and
placed under Euratom safeguards, had been diverted from its intended uses.
The Euratom Safeguards Office has put a lot of effort into clarifying shortcomings in
some operators’ nuclear material accountancy. Operators receive systematic
feedback from the ESO verification activities, which, in turn, has resulted in
improvements in the quality of nuclear material accountancy in the various
installations.
In a number of cases, discrepancies found during inspections or the material balance
evaluation, in particular “Material Unaccounted For” MUF14 figures, required
intensive follow-up by all concerned. There is no alternative to conscientious
investigation and continuous dialogue with the operator in such cases.
Safeguards instrumentation, very often unattended or even with remote data
transmission, is increasingly used to improve the safeguards effectiveness in the
different installations. These tools require still a large amount of human intervention
for installation, maintenance, or troubleshooting.
Electronic equipment, related software, as well as evaluation tools have reached an
adequate level of maturity for inspection use. Their implementation has significantly
helped rationalising inspection planning and reporting.
5. LOGISTICS AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES
5.1. Safeguards Techniques and Logistics
Safeguards techniques and logistics cover the technical means by which the
inspectors assure themselves that the physical quantities of nuclear material
correspond to the accountancy values (see also 3).
Some of the equipment is mobile and transported from headquarters for inspection
use. Examples include sealing devices, radiation detectors, and surveillance systems.
In addition, the ESO has a large inventory of equipment (including computers) that is
installed in many nuclear facilities in the European Union. For all types of
equipment, routine activities include procurement and maintenance.
During the period of this report all safeguards equipment was upgraded to prepare for
the Y2K transition.
14 MUF is the difference between the physical inventory and the book inventory of nuclear material in an
installation.
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The priorities in the area of logistics are to save inspection manpower, to improve the
reliability of the equipment and cost-effectiveness by the use of modern technology.
The most important projects during the reporting period were:
– Implementation of digital video surveillance systems. The use of commercial
standards will reduce the ESO’s dependence on systems developed only for
Safeguards, and an improvement on reliability is intended. This will reduce
investment and support costs.
– Development of a new transponder seal. The aim is to replace the ageing
copper/brass seal, with an electronic device that can be verified in-situ.
– Commissioning and start–up of two on-site laboratories (Sellafield in the UK and
La Hague in France) for the analysis of samples taken by inspectors. The aim is to
reduce the number of transports of radioactive samples and to make the results
available to the inspectors in a shorter time. An important milestone was reached
in September 1999 with the inauguration of the On Site Laboratory at Sellafield
for the handling and analysis of the samples taken for safeguards purposes at
THORP. This was a culmination of a major financial investment by the ESO and
an important collaboration between the ESO, the ITU15, and the operator BNFL.
This was followed in June 2000 by a similar inauguration of the Laboratoire Sur
Site at La Hague for the UP2 and UP3 plants together with COGEMA and SGN,
the engineering subsidiary of COGEMA.
– Implementation of unattended data acquisition systems for radiation monitoring
and measurement systems. The use of 24 hour monitoring systems reduces the
need for inspectors to be present in radiation-controlled areas. The new data
acquisition and review systems are based on commercial standards.
– Remote Data Transmission to the ESO headquarters. Having operational or
inspection data available in Luxembourg should reduce the need to send
inspectors in the field and might reduce the amount of on-site maintenance
required.
5.2. Safeguards Evaluation Methodology
Safeguards relies heavily on the analysis of measured data in order to obtain results
from which conclusions can be drawn. However, these data are subject to errors.
During the reporting period, tools were implemented to assess the inspectors’ and
operators’ measurement error uncertainties based on Destructive Analysis (DA)16
results. Procedures were put in place to evaluate Near Real Time Material
Accountancy17 (NRTMA) data from the THORP reprocessing plant. Methods were
15 The Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) is an institute of the Commission’s Joint Research
Centre (JRC).
16 Destructive Analysis is a qualitative and quantitative determination of a characteristic of a sample of the
item being measured. It requires sample taking and changes the physical form of the sample, and aims
at establishing the total quantity and composition of nuclear material present in the items being
measured.
17 Near Real Time Material Accountancy is a form of material accountancy for bulk handling facilities in
which verification of flow is supplemented by physical inventories taken at frequent intervals, using in–
process instrumentation that does not interfere with process operations. The objective of near real time
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developed to evaluate shipper-receiver differences and volume determinations of in
process tanks.
Computerised statistical tools were developed for in–field use for the statistical
evaluation of MUF, for the re–verification of scale calibration parameters and tank
calibrations at reprocessing plants.
5.3. Information Systems
The Euratom Safeguards Office replaced its information systems by modern client-
server systems. The new information systems cover three main areas: nuclear
materials accountancy, inspection, and administrative and technical support.
Development effort in 1999 went into making information systems Y2K proof. In
addition, work started on several new information systems for inspection support,
handling of DA samples, and seals management.
5.4. Training
Nuclear Safeguards Inspectors are qualified professionals recruited from a wide
spectrum of fields. They typically have scientific, technical or accounting
backgrounds coming from various areas of industry and research.
Safeguards however is a highly specialised area that requires a lot of specific
training. A training profile and programme is established for every new ESO staff
member upon arrival. The Euratom Safeguards Office provides over 60 professional
and technical training courses to inspectors per year. These courses are held at
Luxembourg headquarters, at the JRC establishments, at nuclear installations or in
specialised training institutes, and of course on the job during inspection.
6. CO-OPERATION AND LIAISON
6.1. European Parliament
During the reporting period, the Euratom Safeguards Office had no legislative
dossiers. Its relation to the European Parliament was therefore defined by providing
replies to Parliamentary Questions, dealing mainly with safety and safeguards
aspects of large-scale plutonium processing plants in the European Union. Illicit
trafficking of nuclear material was another important issue addressed in
parliamentary questions. In addition, a number of questions were related to
organisational matters and performance of the Euratom Safeguards Office itself.
6.2. Member States
While the Euratom Treaty stipulates that the Commission through the Euratom
Safeguards Office deals directly with nuclear material operators, the ESO considers
regular contacts with Member States authorities as essential for the smooth
implementation of safeguards in the respective States. In addition, discussions took
material accountancy is to improve the sensitivity and timeliness of detection using statistical tests
specifically tailored to the sequential nature of the data.
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place with a number of Member States to prepare for the implementation of the
measures of the Additional Protocol18 that do not involve nuclear material.
The Atomic Questions Group of the Council was briefed at regular intervals on the
progress made in the preparation of the implementation of the Additional Protocol,
the revision of the Subsidiary Arrangements19 and the IAEA Safeguards
Implementation Reports for the Member States of the European Union.
6.3. Enlargement
The Euratom Safeguards Office does not expect major problems in the field of
safeguards with the accession of the new European Union Member States. All
accession candidates have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and are already
inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
However, in line with the Euratom Treaty plant operators, and not government
authorities, are required to submit reports about nuclear material inventories and
changes directly to the Commission and have to set up accountancy systems in line
with Commission Regulation 3227/76 (see 2.2). The screening exercise carried out in
1998 and 1999 and a number of discussions between the ESO and the applicant
countries revealed that technical assistance might be required to prepare for
accession in order to implement the Euratom safeguards acquis. To this end a project
was set up that will provide plant operators in the applicant countries with a solution
for implementing the Euratom Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) System,




The IAEA and the Euratom Safeguards Office co-operate in the 13 Non Nuclear
Weapon States following the arrangements laid down under the New Partnership
Approach (NPA) as agreed in 1992 between the European Commission and the
IAEA (see also 2.3). Co-operation in the UK and France is performed under the so-
called Joint-Team arrangements. Under the NPA and the Joint Team arrangements,
inspection activities of the IAEA and the Euratom Safeguards Office are executed
jointly. Inspection activities carried out by the Euratom Safeguards Office are taken
into account by the IAEA in drawing its own conclusions and vice-versa.
18 Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria; the Kingdom of Belgium, the
Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic
Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European
Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on
the non–proliferation of nuclear weapons. (Protocol Additional to INFCIRC/193)
19 Subsidiary Arrangements constitute a document containing a set of technical and administrative
procedures designed to implement the safeguards procedures laid down in the Safeguards Agreements
with the IAEA; they deal with matters such as design review, records requirements, reporting
requirements and inspections.
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During the period covered by this report, new common IAEA/Euratom safeguards
approaches were implemented in a MOX fuel fabrication and assembly plant, and
two dry storage installations for spent fuel assemblies.
Technical support activities are an important component of the co–operation of the
ESO with the IAEA. They include common planning of inspections, common
training of inspectors, sharing the analysis of samples for destructive analysis, the
common use of safeguards instruments and software and an important common R&D
programme. As an example, major common R&D projects exist in the areas of
measurements on spent fuel, next generation digital surveillance systems including
remote monitoring, new electronic seals to replace copper brass seals, and
stratification and sampling software
The smooth co-operation of the IAEA and the ESO under the NPA resulted in a
significant improvement of the IAEA safeguards effectiveness in the European
Union over the reporting period as can be concluded from the IAEA 1998 and 1999
Safeguards Implementation Reports. The main problem areas have been addressed
and actions are underway to resolve outstanding problems.
6.4.2. Co-operation in the field of Strengthened Safeguards
A number of elements of the new strengthened safeguards system, which was
developed by the IAEA after the crisis in Iraq in the early nineties, have been
implemented or their implementation is being prepared in the European Union.
For example, field trials for the use of remote monitoring were conducted in a spent
fuel storage facility and a power reactor. Also, safeguards approaches for large
research reactors were agreed between the IAEA and the ESO that include measures
to detect undeclared production of plutonium. A new common safeguards scheme
was implemented in a LEU Fuel Fabrication Plant that includes the routine use of
short notice random inspections as a method to cover statistically all flow of nuclear
material through the installation.
Environmental sampling, or High Performance Trace Analysis (HPTA), is
considered by the IAEA and the ESO as a method that, when properly implemented,
can enhance significantly the effectiveness of safeguards in Enrichment Plants and
potentially also in Hot Cells. The IAEA and the ESO intend to use this method on a
routine basis in Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (see also 4.2.3).
6.4.3. Preparation for the implementation of the Additional Protocol and Integrated
Safeguards
The full implementation of the “Additional Protocol” (AP) will provide the IAEA
with the necessary legal authority to verify the absence of undeclared activities in
States. The ratification process of this Additional Protocol was initiated in all EU
Member States. It has been completed in The Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Greece,
Sweden, and Finland. The Additional Protocol will enter into force in the European
Union only after all signatories have ratified. Some States have asked the
Commission to act on their behalf as the interface with the IAEA in the
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implementation of the AP measures that do not relate to nuclear material20. The
Euratom Safeguards Office started the necessary preparatory work for the
implementation of the Additional Protocol and detailed discussions with the Member
States concerned have commenced. In order to ensure a smooth implementation of
the Additional Protocol, field trials were set up at two sites one in Finland and the
other in the Netherlands
By integrating the measures of the Additional Protocol and classical nuclear material
accountancy measures, a more effective and efficient safeguards system could be
established: the so–called Integrated Safeguards system. The Euratom Safeguards
Office actively assisted the IAEA in the development of such a system, which might
have an impact on Euratom safeguards.
6.5. Third Countries
Three of the Community’s nuclear co-operation agreements, namely the ones with
the United States of America, Canada and Australia, require dedicated control
activities at the Euratom Safeguards Office in order to fulfil the commitments
accepted under these Agreements. These commitments are implemented through
routine exchanges of notifications and other relevant information on imports/exports
of nuclear material subject to one of these Agreements. They also provide for the
respect of the associated export controls. For the period covered by this report, the
three co-operation agreements were implemented to the satisfaction of all Parties
involved.
The Euratom Safeguards Office actively participated in the on–going negotiation of a
nuclear co-operation agreement between Euratom and Japan. The progress achieved
during the negotiation rounds that took place in 1999 and 2000 gives hope for a
successful conclusion of the agreement in the near future.
Following the interest expressed by the Member States for the conclusion of a
nuclear co-operation agreement with China, the Euratom Safeguards Office
participated in a fact-finding mission to Peking. The outcome of the mission
confirmed the mutual interest for the conclusion of such an agreement. It is expected
that a negotiation mandate will be given by the Council to the Commission during
2001.
In addition, regular contacts took place between the Euratom Safeguards Office and
the United States Departments of State and of Energy on technical safeguards issues.
During these contacts, information was exchanged on the implementation of
safeguards, technical and conceptual developments, as well as non-proliferation
issues. Also in the field of R&D, extensive contacts exist between the US and the
ESO, in the form of a number of task sheets for the development of various
safeguards techniques.
20 These measures include the provision of information on nuclear fuel cycle related R&D, a description
of each building on each nuclear site, information on nuclear fuel cycle related operations, information
regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material, complementary and managed access to any
place in a state.
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Regular contacts took also place between the Euratom Safeguards Office and
ABACC, the Argentine and Brazil Regional Safeguards Organisation. These contacts
involved participating and lecturing in training courses and workshops.
7. VARIOUS PROJECTS
7.1. Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material
No serious cases involving illicit trafficking of nuclear material were detected nor
reported in the European Union during the period 1999–2000. This seems to be the
result of the combined effect of improved detection and prevention capabilities in the
Eastern European countries and of a better knowledge of the risks by the potential
smugglers.
Some minor cases involving the discovery of small quantities of nuclear material
with insignificant strategic value occurred. In most cases, the co–operation with the
Member State authorities was excellent, a standard procedure was adopted to bring
the material under safeguards, and to have it properly accounted for.
The Euratom Safeguards Office continued to play an active role in experts groups
where prevention and detection mechanisms and communication and intervention
procedures were discussed. The Euratom Safeguards Office provided expertise when
requested, worked in close co–operation with the IAEA and maintained informal
contact with the national authorities, Europol and other dedicated interagency
groups.
The Euratom Safeguards Office also participated, together with the Institute for
Transuranium elements (ITU) of the JRC, in the work of the Nuclear Smuggling
International Technical Working Group (ITWG) created in 1995 under the auspices
of the G8. In particular, the Euratom Safeguards Office organised, together with a
US laboratory, a successful interlaboratory comparison exercise aiming at
developing forensic methods for better route and origin attribution of seized material.
7.2. Co-operation with the Russian Federation
Co–operation between the Euratom Safeguards Office and the Russian Federation in
the field of safeguards began in 1993. The Euratom Safeguards Office assisted the
Russian authorities in developing and implementing computerised nuclear material
accountancy and control systems, preparing and implementing of physical inventory
takings by operators and national inspectors, delivery of safeguards instrumentation,
establishing seals management procedures and databases, as well as organising
safeguards training and conferences.
In 2000, the decision was taken to streamline the Commission’s assistance
programmes and, as a consequence, the co-operation programme between the
European Commission and the Russian Federation in the area of safeguards will in
the future be fully implemented in the framework of the Tacis programme, with a




The Euratom Safeguards Office employs a team of inspectors plus appropriate
administrative and logistical support in its headquarters in Luxembourg.
At the end of 2000, the Euratom Safeguards Office counted 274 permanent posts: 75
A–grades, 148 B–grades, 50 C–grades, and 1 D–grade. Of these posts, 211 are
allocated to staff having the nuclear inspectors statute. This includes operational
inspectors and support inspectors, all in the A and B categories.
8.2. Budget
Article 174 of the Euratom Treaty specifically mentions the necessity to include
provisions in the Commission's budget for operational expenditure relating to
safeguards. In virtue of this legal basis there are - apart from the general budget
appropriations for salaries, offices, IT equipment, telecommunications etc. (budget
part A) - some specific appropriations in the operating budget (budget part B and in
particular sub-chapter B4-2) which are foreseen for expenditure such as inspection
mission cost, purchase of technical equipment, contracts for services, transport,
training, etc. Other credits concern the ESO co-operation with Russia and
enlargement. The ESO itself manages the part B budget lines administratively. Table
4 shows the evolution of the specific safeguards budget lines over the past years.
9. CONCLUSIONS
The Euratom Safeguards Office performs safeguards on all civil nuclear material in
the European Union. Its legal basis and scope is defined in the Treaty establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community signed in 1957. It has the necessary
infrastructure for data handling, evaluation and inspection support. Co-operation with
the IAEA assures effective and efficient safeguards under NPT in the European
Union.
The period under review was characterised by a steady increase in quantity and
sensitivity of nuclear material under safeguards in the European Union. To cope with
such an evolution, the Euratom Safeguards Office streamlined, improved,
modernised and upgraded, on a regular basis, its methods, equipment and systems
(including information technology).
As a result of its activities in 1999 and 2000, and subsequent evaluations, the
Euratom Safeguards Office did not find any indication that nuclear materials were
diverted from their intended peaceful uses. The “Material Unaccounted For” (MUF),
which is one of the indicators of diversion was acceptable for nearly all installations.
Small discrepancies found during inspections or the material balance evaluation were
rectified or are still being investigated with the operators concerned.
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Plutonium 203 406 506 531
Uranium
Total 200 400 269 100 309 600 312 900
HEU 13 11 10 10
LEU 32 000 46 700 54 000 55 300
NU 44 000 51 400 55 200 53 800
DU 124 400 171 000 200 400 203 800
Thorium 2 600 4 600 4 500 4 500
Table 2 – ESO Inspection Effort
Person days of
inspection in: 1999 2000
NNWS 2 412 2 113
France 3 492 3 426
UK 2 871 2 895
Total 8 775 8 434
Table 3 – ESO Staff Situation End 2000
A–Grades B–Grades C–Grades D–Grades Total
Direction 4 10 13 1 28
Inspection 1 22 40 7 0 69
Inspection 2 22 45 6 0 73
Accountancy
and Control 6 18 6 0 30
Basic
Concepts 14 27 15 0 56
Informatics 6 8 3 0 17
Total 74 148 50 1 273
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Table 4 – ESO Evolution of the Specific Safeguards Budget (in thousands Euro)




2 455 3 500 4 200 4 687 5 400 5 700
Instruments








/ / 1 800 2 000 1 400 PhasingOut
TOTAL 7 355 10 500 19 200 15 787 16 400 16 700
Radiation protection
(part of A0 1420) 140 255 285 200 200 220
